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This thesis argues that language in general, and proper names in particular, are 
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narrative gaps enclosed in proper names enable the audience to become an active 
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Ferré and García Márquez, this exposition shows how names, as conveyors of different 
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Thesis Mentor:___________________________________ 
Dr. Toby Graves 
   Honors Director: __________________________________ 
 Dr. Steven Engel 
 
April 2014 
Department of Foreign Languages 
University Honors Program 
Georgia Southern University 
Acknowledgements:  
I would like to start by expressing my sincere appreciation to Dr. Toby 
Graves. I feel very thankful she accepted to supervise this project, as her 
openness and enthusiasm, not to mention her many questions and suggestions, 
really helped me throughout this endeavor. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. 
Hemchand Gossai for the time he invested addressing my concerns during the 
Honors Research Seminar(s) I took with him. It has been my pleasure to have 
him reading over my multiple drafts in order to help me to find new ways to 
improve this piece. Likewise, I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Beth 
Butterfield, who did not directly participate in the writing of this thesis but 
generously agreed to work with me in the Independent Studies project that 
represented my first encounter with the philosophy of Michel Foucault and 
Jacques Derrida. During this time, Dr. Butterfield showed such good disposition 
towards the exploration of new ideas and new philosophical approaches that I 
could not help but feeling inspired by her eagerness to reconsider that which we 
believe we know.  
Last but not least, I would like to thank my “family.” And the reason why I 
am placing this in quotation marks is because I would like this term to mean 
something different from what it usually means. I would like “family” in this 
context to mean all of those who have granted me the honor of “listening,” and 
who have actively participated in the journey that the writing of this thesis 
represented. I believe neither of us are the same after the many conversations 
that accompanied the making of this piece, and I am deeply thankful for that. 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 
Theoretical Framework ...................................................................................................... 4 
Why Deconstruction ............................................................................................... 4 
Understanding the Means and the Ends of Deconstruction .................................. 6 
Authors/Texts Chosen ...................................................................................................... 12 
Textual Analysis ................................................................................................................ 16 
“When Women Love Men” by Rosario Ferré ....................................................... 16 
  Memories of My Melancholy Whores by García Márquez ................................... 24 
The Role of Performativity and Context .......................................................................... 30 
Names as Narrative Gaps ...................................................................................... 30 
John Austin and the Literary Work as an Exercise of Performative Language ..... 32 
Tracing performativity in WWLM and MOMMW ................................................. 35 
Jacques Derrida on the Meaning of Context ........................................................ 38 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 43 
 
  
S u a r e z  | 1 
 
Part 1 – Introduction: 
Discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use 
these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them 
irreducible to the language and speech. It is this ‘more’ that we must 
reveal and describe - Michel Foucault’s The Archeology of Knowledge 
The goal that Michel Foucault set for himself was that of 
investigating the production of knowledge, “its formation, dispersion, 
transmission, and permanence in terms of ‘anonymous rules’” which he 
considered to be extremely precise and specialized (Said 28). In doing 
this, Foucault opened a Pandora’s Box insofar as issues pertaining to the 
definition of authorship, power, and subject became a never-ending puzzle 
that obstructed the possibility of offering a conclusive explanation of how 
knowledge comes to be. In this sense, understanding how a verbal cluster 
becomes part of a discursive layer, whose purpose is not only to express 
what an individual thinks but also to affect and endorse a certain practice 
and its common articulation, became essential to the process of 
elucidating meaning (29). 
Foucault’s explorations on the nature of language as a product and 
enabler of power put him in line with the concerns of his compatriot 
Jacques Derrida. Both Foucault and Derrida seek “a continuation of 
philosophy means for other ends” (Guttin 289), and, as a consequence, 
they both prompted their audiences to question the semantic unit of 
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books, while encouraging them to understand all texts as exercises of 
“inconstant epistemological judgments” (Said 30). By adopting this 
position, both thinkers aligned themselves with Heidegger, who, as part of 
his contributions to the development of hermeneutics, asserted that all 
knowledge rests “always already” upon interpretative historical 
presuppositions, which are often “just as a person’s eyeglasses […] 
typically ‘invisible’ to the extent that they function silently and unnoticeably, 
and become objects of attention perhaps only when they happen to break” 
(Coker 252). 
And yet, we cannot do without our “eyeglasses.” We need 
language. This is a fact that neither Foucault nor Derrida questioned. 
What we do not need, or, perhaps, what we cannot afford, is to take texts, 
the product of language, at their “face value.” In this way, understanding 
the “more” that Foucault refers to in the quote I cited at the beginning of 
this section prompts us to analyze the extra load carried by discourse. Yet, 
this revaluation, this encountering with a new way of looking at discourse 
cannot take place outside the realm of text. Even if we ought to 
deconstruct what is given to us, we will invariably build a new form of text 
by reinterpreting reality. As Derrida famously asserted: “there is nothing 
outside the text” (Derrida 163). This is why for deconstructionists, all 
contexts are always text, and all texts are to become context.  
  Following the steps of deconstructionists, this paper argues that 
language in general, and proper names in particular, are surreptitious 
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examples of narrative gaps. To this extent, in the context of literature, the 
narrative gaps enclosed in proper names enable the audience to become 
an active participant in a type of writing that exceeds the limit of the 
specific literary text at hand. In deconstructing the way in which proper 
names and nicknames are used by Rosario Ferré and García Márquez, 
this thesis argues that names, as conveyors of different identities, 
systematically enable an exercise of différance:  they distinguish subjects 
while postponing an actual description of their individuality. This emptiness 
of ultimate meaning, however, has been disguised through the means of 
further narrative gaps (such as “prostitute,” “wife,” or “husband”) that 
transfer the responsibility of assigning meaning onto the shoulders of the 
readers. In order to understand the implications of this assertion, this 
thesis reflects on the nature of reading and writing, as well as the 
differences that, apparently, keep literature and reality apart. Finally, by 
engaging the ideas of John L. Austin and Jacques Derrida, this work aims 
to contribute to an understanding of how literary works such as the ones 
analyzed here, may challenge the notion of authorship altogether by 
forcing the reader to complete a textual reality that does more than map 
preexisting circumstances, it actively writes them.  
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Part 2 - Theoretical Framework 
Why Deconstruction? 
As explained in the previous section, the aim of deconstructing is not to 
destroy but to dismantle in order to expose the responsibilities attached to the 
production of meaning. As a strategy of reading, deconstruction aims at 
unraveling and building over the contradictions of every text. Hence, instead of 
aiming for truth, unity, or meaning, a deconstructive reading focuses on absence 
of presence, loopholes, and free play of signifieds. Consequently, deconstruction 
suggests that every reading, every interpretation in a way invests members of the 
audience with the “author-function” (as understood by Foucault) insofar as 
readers are responsible for the text they build out and pass along into the context 
that defines and is defined by the text produced by them (Foucault 118-119). 
However, while Foucault in his acclaimed piece “What is An Author” mainly 
discusses authorship in terms of the function that the term serves within a 
community, in this thesis I am attempting to focus on the dynamic that precedes 
any collective negotiation of meaning. In this sense, the author described by 
Foucault and the writer(s) discussed in this piece do not engage in the same kind 
of project. While the concept of “author,” as described by Foucault, is to be 
understood as an inherent mode of discourse that is conceived with the purpose 
of limiting a “proliferation of meaning” and, as such, has a direct effect on society 
(Foucault  118), the “writers” discussed in this analysis (and who are mistakenly 
considered to be just readers) act for the most part privately, while moving back 
and forth across the larger picture that we come to call context. From this it 
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follows that while authors play an important role as members of interpretive 
communities, writers (as described in this analysis) operate at a more basic level: 
they are the real creators of meaning, insofar as they are the ones who “execute” 
the text by bringing it to life in their minds. Only later, writers (these being first-
writers or posterior ones –readers-) take the challenge of joining others in order 
to negotiate a reading that is going to be shared by the community. Nevertheless, 
at first glance, every writer is alone with the text. And what she does with it is an 
act of writing (or re-writing in the case of readers) which is intrinsically private. To 
understand the responsibility of the Foucauldian “author” we are to consider the 
ways in which every text changes its society, while to understand the meaning of 
writers as presented in this thesis, we are to reflect on the ways in which each 
reader changes the text that is given to her by other writers.  
To this effect, using Ferré’s and García-Márquez’s texts as examples, this 
thesis deconstructs proper names in order to show their value as narrative gaps 
that challenge the traditional notion of authorship while enabling a playing of 
différance (as defined in the next section). In this way, writers engage in a 
dissemination of their identity while crafting a text, given that those who will read 
their work in the future will never be able to apprehend the ultimate “meaning” of 
their message, and will therefore be called to inscribe a certain “meaning” to the 
text in order to be able to make “sense” of the story. In order to expose how 
these dynamics take place in the production of literary texts, my analysis will 
draw heavily from the philosophical approach to language and discourse 
proposed by Jacques Derrida, and the way in which linguistic exercises attempt 
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to disguise the dislocation and intentionality that characterize our cultural 
practices. In doing this, I will address how apparently well-defined characters are 
ultimately empty shells whose function is to engender different associations, and, 
as a consequence, enable a wide range of interpretations that invariably result in 
a new instance of writing that can only be executed by readers.  
 
Understanding the Means and the Ends of Deconstruction: 
Logocentrism, Différance, Supplement, and Trace 
Derrida claimed that traditional philosophical issues are indecidable in 
principle (Coker 290), insofar as they are based on an approach to reality that 
lies on the assumption that being is to be understood in terms of presence (what 
is by opposition to what is not). This predisposition to ground all knowledge (and 
truth) in the specific certainty provided by presence (“metaphysics of presence”) 
informed the approach to knowledge of a variety of schools of thought, such as 
foundationalism, essentialism, rationalism, and representationism. According to 
Derrida, the metaphysics of presence is related to a longing for “an immediate 
access to meaning” which motivates the idea that grasping presence is an 
unequivocal manner of accessing truth, what it is (266). In addition, Derrida 
asserted that this assumption that presence can unequivocally convey truth is the 
reason why, throughout history, Western philosophers in particular have placed 
great emphasis on the importance of oral speech in contrast to the “delayed” 
value of written discourse (267). This idea that language, and in particular oral 
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speech, is not a mediator of meaning but an immediate facilitator of it is known 
as “logocentrism.”  
However, for Derrida, linguistic formulation is never completely adequate. 
Despite the illusion that it is possible to attain access to pure meaning (especially 
through speech, which has been traditionally considered as the primary and 
immediate expression of thought), Derrida asserted that such an enterprise is 
impossible, as linguistic signs are not “transcendental signifiers” (namely, self-
signifying units of meaning) but agents of deferral (différance). In other words, 
given that verbal meaning is constantly built upon the use of other signifiers, 
whose meaning is not simultaneously present (e.g., the understanding of the 
term “mistress” requires a previous knowledge of concepts such as “marriage,” 
“wife,” and “husband,” and the way they limit and extend the meaning of each 
other), it is clear that language cannot provide the basis for any absolute-
unchangeable externalization of “pure meaning”. Any message, oral or written, 
conveyed by the means of verbal clusters that are demonstrably unstable and 
which lack ultimate grounds (given that they are always susceptible to 
recontextualization) cannot facilitate a pure and final experience of any pre-
linguistic experience of meaning. Moreover, according to Derrida, we do not even 
have a reason to believe that such essential form of pure meaning can, in any 
way, be accessed by human beings. We never experience the content of such 
mental states without the aid of language (Coker 266). In this manner, text and 
context are inherently interwoven with each other. 
If we agree with Derrida, it is obvious that we constantly apply a curbed 
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way of relating and reflecting upon the world, for he made it obvious that using 
language to understand our surrounding imposes a necessity to prioritize 
presence over absence, which immediately forces us to adopt an approach to 
reality that is always defined by a  “principle of opposition,” that is, the idea that 
reality can only be grasped in terms of dichotomies such as presence/absence, 
truth/falsehood, self/other, etc. Yet, Derrida tells us, such is our way of thinking, 
and therefore, we can only hope that the study of its characteristics (which is in 
itself based and structured upon the linguistic system that it attempts to question) 
will help us to gain a more vast understanding of the “essential peculiarities and 
limitations of human thought” (Guttin 291). 
 To assist in this process, Derrida attempted to facilitate a new way of 
reading, which he called “deconstruction.” The purpose of deconstruction is to 
show the ways in which language inserts contradictions and ambiguity into all 
texts, and that this unavoidably results in the inability of readers to fully 
comprehend any given text. To this extent, all discourse implies a lack of ultimate 
meaning, which is only concealed by a series of choices performed by its 
receptacles while engaging with the text. In light of this, deconstruction takes 
advantage of concepts such as différance, supplementation, and trace in order to 
explain how we arrive at the production of textual meaning. Deconstructionists 
assert that all texts become ultimately ambiguous and dependent on the unstable 
external and internal relations that constitute them. Therefore, the notions of 
différance, supplementation, and trace are essential in order to understand how 
the meaning of a text is never a coherent unit but rather a collection of shifts and 
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breaks that ultimately prove the attempt to unify or limit the text within the 
boundaries of a singular interpretation, futile.  
Derrida’s différance alludes to the instability that characterizes the 
binaries’ opposition, which constitutes the basis of all logocentric discourse. The 
term has two basic connotations: difference and deferral. The first, refers to the 
inherent distinction that exists between any pair of binaries and the “reality” that 
they are supposed to describe (this is why even an apparent understanding of 
the dichotomy presence/absence does not grant us a full understanding of the 
phenomenon “existence”). The second connotation alludes to the constant 
deferral that takes place every time we try to unequivocally attribute self-sufficient 
meaning to a term. According to Derrida, what actually takes place is a constant 
exercise of deferral by which we contrast words and define them by opposition 
(this is why to understand the adjective “blue” we need to know the definition of 
color and the particular characteristics that permit us to distinguish blue from 
green and violet). However, we never arrive at an ultimate-pure-isolated 
meaning, and therefore, the only thing we can do is to keep resorting to this 
exercise of difference and deferral in order to shape a new message every time 
we attempt to communicate. In being constant, this exercise perpetuates the 
simultaneous active/passive nature of différance, active insofar as it never ends 
and passive insofar as it is the only possible “state.” Yet, Derrida claims that even 
the term différance is caught in the inadequacy of logocentric discourse, and, as 
a product of such, it can be used as an instrument to understand the limitations 
of such type of discourse, but not to overcome it (298-299). 
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 Likewise, the term supplement is also a Derridean concept that refers to two 
different connotations. On the one hand, it refers to an inessential addendum, or extra, 
that is not necessary in nature. On the other hand, it can also allude to a crucial addition, 
meant to solve an essential incompleteness in that to which is added. Derrida believes 
that this term can be key to understanding the way in which the two elements that 
constitute every binary we use to construct meaning relate to each other. According to 
Derrida, in the context of binary oppositions, the second term is always considered to be 
a (inessential) supplement of the first one, and this is why “presence” acquires a better 
connotation than “absence,” and “speech” is better than “writing” (302). However, Derrida 
considered this overvaluation to be an artificial distinction that does not capture the “real” 
function of the second term. Therefore, it is the purpose of deconstruction to show that 
the supplement (second term) is actually an essential component of reality, insofar as it 
remedies a lack or insufficiency of the first element. 
By trace, Derrida refers to that which is not a presence but rather “the 
simulacrum of a presence that dislocates, displaces, and refers beyond itself” (301). 
A trace is therefore that tangible element that encompasses that which is accessible 
(the signifier) but which, at the same time, refers us to the absences that surround its 
meaning. In this way, the trace “woman” unavoidably forces us to think of those 
conditions that have to be met for a human being to be labeled this way, and, at the 
same time, it also requires that we know well those characteristics that should not be 
present for this person to be considered a “woman”. 
These are the basic neologisms-assumptions embraced by deconstruction. 
Yet, it is important to remember that all experience, for deconstructionists, is always 
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available in textualized form. In this way, discourse is not just an isolated occurrence 
of speech or writing, but the trace (in the Derridean sense) of an ideology that 
defines and confines the way in which members of society think and act. Therefore, 
de-constructing, as a means of literary analysis refers to the process by which we 
construct a new reality by re-situating what is given to us. This is precisely the task 
this thesis undertakes while deconstructing the ways in which Rosario Ferré and 
Gabriel García Márquez construct and deliver the identity of their characters.  
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Part 3- Authors and Texts Chosen 
A principal point addressed in this paper is the dynamic that takes place 
between what I will be calling “first-writer” (these being the ones who proceeded 
to write a first draft of the literary text) and readers, or “posterior-writers.”  And it 
is precisely in order to lay bare the subliminal ways in which first-writers and 
posterior ones interact and switch roles that I have chosen to deconstruct a short 
story by Rosario Ferré and a novella by García Márquez. Ferré wrote “Cuando 
las mujeres quieren a los hombres” (“When Women Love Men”) in 1977, while 
García Márquez published Memorias de mis putas tristes (Memories of my 
Melancholy Whores) in 2004. Therefore, both texts belong to a period in history 
where the role of the Latin American “macho” as well as the traditional “values” 
that for centuries attributed a “conventional” (passive) role to women began to be 
questioned. Yet, it is interesting to explore the terms within which this questioning 
takes place. Is the language involved in this discussion an enabler of 
replacement or an agent of recycling? In deconstructing both texts, this analysis 
will focus on the ways in which readers partake in the re-construction of meaning 
in order to render the stories legible. While carrying on with analysis, we will pay 
special attention to the dynamics that mix together the literary universe and “the 
real world,” in order to decipher how the discourse that serves as context for 
each text shapes and is shaped by the “message” produced by different readers.  
Each of the writers chosen plays a different role in the context of the 
socio-historical setting of Latin American discourse. Rosario Ferré, a Puerto 
Rican writer born in 1938 from a wealthy and influential family, has shown from a 
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very early stage a concern for exposing female stereotypes, and the ways in 
which women, in the context of patriarchal societies, are systematically 
subjugated regardless of racial or socio-economic differences. In her acclaimed 
essay titled “The Writer’s Kitchen,” Ferré claims the she writes as a way to 
destroy and construct her-self, in an attempt to grow and change through the 
pieces she produces. In stating this, Ferré shares her “faith” in the 
transformational power of words, which, according to this writer, have granted 
her a “unique identity” which “owes its existence only to [her] own efforts” (Ferré 
227). 
Examples of some of the pieces that better illustrate this exercise are 
Ferré’s “La muñeca menor” (“The Youngest Doll”), “Maldito Amor” (“Sweet 
Diamond Dust”), “Amalia,” and, of course, “Cuando las mujeres quieren a los 
hombres” (“When Women Love Men”). The way in which Ferré captures the 
common experience of the female oppressed has granted her the admiration of 
critics who highlighted the writer’s ability to create harmony out of dissonance 
(Fernández Olmos 43). In this sense, and despite her outspoken interest in 
annihilating herself and the world, Rosario Ferré emerges as a skillful negotiator 
of meaning who understands how to breach the apparent discord that keeps 
every day experience and literary creations apart.  
In “When Women Love Men,” Ferré describes the way in which two 
women cope with the death of their mutual lover. One of these women is the 
widow of the deceased while the other is his former mistress. In his will, 
Ambrosio (the unfaithful husband) disposed that the house he used to share with 
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his respectable wife was to be shared by both women upon his death. This last 
wish not only resulted in a very intimate quarrel between the two women, it also 
triggered a quest for self-understanding which each of the female characters 
undertook alone, and which Ferré transmits to the audience by means of very 
intense monologues. Described as “one of Ferré’s most pitiless probes into 
feminine psychology” by the editors of The Oxford Book of Latin American Short 
Stories, this story fits the scope of this project well as it is my goal to show that 
Rosario Ferré, in actuality, does not really have the last word when it comes to 
writing this story. We as readers do.  
García Márquez, on the other hand, is a very “masculine” writer insofar as 
he crafts texts where male characters always remain in the spotlight. Born in 
Colombia, in 1927, García Márquez became famous with his 1967 novel One 
Hundred Years of Solitude and has since produced a prolific amount of short 
stories, essays, and novels. A common motif of his writing is the association of 
“potency” (as the opposite of sexual impotency) with agency and success (Hart 
Molen 1) as illustrated, for example, by El otoño del patriarca (The Autumn of the 
Patriarch), El amor en los tiempos del cólera (Love in the Time of Cholera), and 
“Muerte constante después del amor” (“Death Constant Beyond Love”). 
Memorias de mis putas tristes (Memories of my Melancholy Whores) is 
not an exception. This novel describes the vicissitudes of a mediocre journalist 
who, on the eve of his ninetieth birthday decided to give a present to himself by 
spending the night in the arms of a fourteen-year-old virgin, even though this 
would initiate the maiden in the arts of prostitution. In the midst of this adventure, 
S u a r e z  | 15 
 
the main character finds himself divided between love and lust, potency and 
impotency, and ultimately between life and death. I argue that the kind of death 
García Márquez’s narrator faces is intimately related to the will of his readers, 
who, much more than the first-writer, possess the ability to render his existence 
irrelevant.  
Deconstructing these stories should present us with an opportunity to re-
construct the ways we read them, not publicly but privately. At this level, this 
paper argues, the utterance of a word becomes the execution of a choice, and 
therefore, the idea that words always lack meaning become questionable.  In 
order to discern how the two texts analyzed here prompt us to make our own 
choices in order to produce a specific reading, we should now proceed to the 
textual analysis.  
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Textual Analysis: “When Women Love Men” by Rosario Ferré 
“Conocemos sólo en parte y profetizamos sólo en parte, pero cuando 
llegue lo perfecto desaparecerá lo parcial. Ahora vemos por un espejo y 
oscuramente, mas entonces veremos cara a cara” – San Pablo, primer epístola 
a los corintios. 
 
“For we know in part and we prophesy in part; but when the perfect 
comes, the partial will be done away. For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then 
face to face; now I know in part, but then I will know fully.” - 1 Corinthians 
 
Proper Names and Identity as Forms of Text 
 
The fact that Rosario Ferré chose to introduce this quote at the beginning 
of “When Women Love Men” reveals that this story deals with fragmented 
understanding (perception) and mirrored images. Perception plays an important 
role in the purpose attributed to mirrors, and Ferré takes advantage of this 
connection in order to write a story whose narrative force is driven by the 
interplay of binaries, such as the ones inscribed in the idea of totality-partiality, 
and the two sides of a mirror, which always provide a fragmented perception of 
the object lying on the other side.  
In the context of “When Women Love Men,” the narration becomes in itself 
a mirror through which the three main characters of the story interact with the 
society that engendered them and builds itself upon them. On its surface, 
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oppositions are generated by the means of juxtapositions and contrasts, such as 
the ones that keep the two Isabels fusing together while attempting to annihilate 
each other, and function as the driving force of the story: “De esta manera 
habíamos alcanzado [...] casi una armonía perfecta entre los tres. Yo, que la 
amaba cada día más y más, comencé a mortificar mi carne [...] para hacer que 
ella volviera al camino del bien” (Ferré 39). In this way, the narration becomes a 
puzzle that follows the female characters through their quest to achieve the 
capture (appropriation) of the other Isabel. However, the characteristics of the 
other are hardly inherent to the individual but mostly a result of the assumptions 
and expectations society has imposed upon her. Therefore, throughout the 
unfolding of the story it becomes obvious that each Isabel is mostly a product of 
what their social environment requires her to be, as illustrated by the following 
passage “Tú fuiste el culpable, Ambrosio, de que no se supiera hasta hoy cuál 
era cuál entre las dos, Isabel Luberza recogiendo dinero para restaurar los 
leones de yeso de la plaza [...] o Isabel la Negra, preparando su cuerpo para 
recibir el semen de los niños ricos” (Ferré 24).  It is in this sense that the story is 
built upon a commodification of identity that compels each woman to convince 
the male figures around them that she is the real Isabel, the one that can better 
please and serve them.  
Proper names play a major role in this realization. In the context of “When 
Women Love Men,” names function as artifacts of the process of objectification 
and individualization that surrounds the establishment of identity, as something 
attributed by others. Therefore, proper names function as a very particular type of 
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text and become the facilitators of experience (perception) by acting as a trace of 
the existence of others. Names are what allow outsiders to refer to a certain 
subject. With this in mind, this analysis deconstructs the way in which names are 
used in the context of “When Women Love Men” to establish hierarchies and 
assign identity. 
 
The act of naming as an act of territorialization: Ambrosio as 
assigner of meaning 
 
Naming is in itself an act of supplementation as names convey a 
substitution (of presence) and an addition at the same time (we know a person is, 
even when we do not yet know her name; in this sense, learning a name means 
learning an additional piece of information about a given individual). In this way, 
names undermine the importance of experience (the fact that the object named 
may have changed over time) for the sake of facilitating recognition, as they 
serve the purpose of specifying identity by fixing it. In doing so, names become 
an instance of territorialization, an effort to conquer and define for the sake of 
communication. In the context of “When Women Love Men,” names assign value 
and, in doing so, they affix an identity. Yet, as the story progresses we discover 
that these assigned identities deeply trouble the way in which the main 
characters interact, as they are condemned to fulfill an image that depends on 
the way others see them. Consequently, the names of Ambrosio, Isabel Luberza, 
and Isabel la Negra, all become agents of differentiation and supplementation 
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whose main purpose is to facilitate a certain classification of the characteristics 
they incarnate.  
From the beginning of the story, the narrator engages three subjects in her 
account. The more particular of these characters is Ambrosio, the unfaithful 
husband, who, despite being dead seems omnipresent due to the constant 
mentioning of his name. The remaining two characters, the wife and the lover of 
Ambrosio, are both called Isabel, signaling the fact that they are condemned to 
share much more than a first name. The two Isabels are only distinguishable 
from one another because of race and socioeconomic differences which, of 
course, are also parts of their names (“la Negra” and “Luberza”). However, in the 
course of the narration these differences become less relevant than the fact that 
neither of them is male, which translates into a common lack of autonomy. Both 
women are depicted as Ambrosio’s property, and as such, they are deprived 
from wholeness (they are not independent but live as satellites of Ambrosio) 
illustrating the social belief that only a man can utterly complete a woman.  
Additionally, the fact that throughout the story only Ambrosio is afforded a 
unique name, grants the husband the status of a fixed presence. The fact that 
other young males are mentioned vaguely, in passing, implies that their presence 
is not as stable or important as Ambrosio’s, who is seen by others (such as his 
friends who trust him with the initiation of their sons, or the two women who are 
defined by their role in his life) as an assigner of identity. According to Helene 
Cixous, this role is vital in the context of phallocentric (male dominated) societies, 
which depend on hierarchical oppositions, such as “man-woman,” “self-other,” 
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“wife-mistress,” and which impose the need for an “assigner” (of meaning) and a 
“receptacle” (38). In the context of Ferré’s story, the establishment of Ambrosio 
as a provider of meaning, and point of reference, is enabled through the 
deference conveyed by Ambrosio’s name.  
 In reading “When Women Love Men” we observe that all passive 
receptacles are deprived of a distinctive proper name. As a result, they become 
supplements that can easily displace and replace others, but which are ultimately 
interchangeable. This assumption is supported by their lack of a singular name. 
This description applies to the two Isabels but also to the wealthy young men that 
frequent Isabel la Negra, given that neither of them is considered as a 
memorable lover. Only Ambrosio, the patriarch assigner of meaning, is 
irreplaceable: “Porque nosotras, Isabel Luberza e Isabel la Negra, en nuestra 
pasión por ti Ambrosio, desde el comienzo de los siglos nos habíamos estado 
acercando [...] purificándonos de todo aquello que nos definía” (Ferré 23).  In this 
manner, the name of the main male character, the only man who is afforded a 
proper name in the context of the narration, becomes the trace par excellence 
insofar as its mention extends the presence of the deceased beyond his death, 
and in doing so allows him to continue to affect the lives of those who survived 
him.  
 
One mirror – two Isabels 
 
The other main characters of the story are the widow and former mistress 
of Ambrosio, the two Isabels. There are many ways in which Isabel Luberza and 
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Isabel la Negra appear to be two sides of the same coin. So much so that in 
several instances their voices become one: “Nosotras, tu querida y tu mujer, 
siempre hemos sabido que debajo de cada dama de sociedad se oculta una 
prostituta [...] Porque nosotras siempre hemos sabido que cada prostituta es una 
dama en potencia (Ferré 23). Yet, the proclamation of the similarities that could 
bring them together is always undermined by the acceptance of their differences. 
The labels assigned to each woman, which range from “lover” to “wife, and from 
“prostitute” to “lady,” not merely describe but assign social roles. Likewise, the 
proper names assigned to each character, in effect, enact a specific (racial and 
class based) understanding of their identities. In this way, each Isabel is 
“trapped” within the name that captures her place in society. Yet, when we learn 
that Isabel la Negra yearns to live in the house of Isabel Luberza (Ferré 30) while 
the latter cherished the scandalous Cherries Jubilee fingernail polish used by the 
former (Ferré 26), we realize that both women feel profoundly incomplete as they 
both feel that they are missing a part of themselves that is being played by the 
other woman. Consequently, each Isabel longs for the annihilation of the other as 
a separate being. 
 
The Appropriation of the Other –Rivalry, Possession and the act of 
naming 
 
In “When Women Love Men” the annihilation of the rival that each Isabel 
longs for has very special characteristics. It entails fusing with the other:  
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Porque nosotras, Isabel Luberza e Isabel la Negra, en nuestra pasión por 
ti, Ambrosio, desde el comienzo de los siglos, nos habíamos estado 
acercando, nos habíamos estado santificando la una a la otra sin darnos 
cuenta […] De tal manera que al final, cuando una de nosotras le ganó a 
la otra, fue nuestro más sublime acto de amor. (Ferré 23-24) 
 
However, it is still annihilation, since there can only be one Isabel to 
emerge from their struggle. Insofar as both females are restrained to function in a 
world where phallocentric values force them to refer to men as the source of 
meaning, it is not surprising to observe that their interpersonal relations are 
consequently pervaded by a sense of rivalry. In imitating the values embraced by 
males like Ambrosio, their goal in life become seizing, not sharing.   
Consequently, throughout the entire narration, both Isabels continuously 
struggle to incarnate the signified of the noun “woman.” In doing so, they remain 
halted in a confrontational mindset where each of them covets the characteristics 
of the other that attracted Ambrosio in the first place. The rationality of this 
behavior lies in the fact that the phallocentric discourse that characterizes 
patriarchal societies depends on hierarchical oppositions (man/woman, 
master/slave), which impose the need for an “assigner” (of meaning) and a 
“receptacle” (Cixous 38). And even though women are expected to occupy the 
latter role in their interactions with men (as females have been traditionally 
associated with “passivity” while their male counterparts are considered “givers” 
par excellence), they are still forced to compete with each other in order to be 
granted the privilege of entering the established binary: man/woman, 
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husband/wife, father/mother. However, this is only an “internal” antagonism 
affecting the way in which females relate among themselves, and which does not 
affect the way in which women relate to men. That is, as passive objects, 
females are to subject themselves to the standards of men, as they are the ones 
in charge of defining the desirable characteristics they expect to encounter in a 
“real” woman. 
Yet, Rosario Ferré’s story never offers a definite definition of what a 
woman wants to be, must be, or is actually expected to be. The narration 
concludes by erasing the differences that justified the quarrel that took place in 
public, but leaves the audience with the responsibility of explaining what they 
“witnessed” while reading the story. Moreover, given that this “evaluation” has to 
occur privately, each reader has an opportunity to “act” upon the text, before the 
piece itself has an opportunity to “act” upon the individual reader.  
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Textual Analysis: Memories of My Melancholy Whores  by García Márquez 
 “Es imposible no terminar siendo como los otros creen que uno es.” – García Márquez, 
citando a Julio César 
“It is impossible not to become what others believe you are.” – García Márquez, quoting 
Julius Caesar 
Proper Names as Supplements of Identity 
 
 In analyzing García Márquez’s novella, it is possible to identify some of 
the same themes used by Rosario Ferré. Memories of My Melancholy Whores is 
also built upon the commodification of identity and the interplay of fragmented 
understanding (which prompt the main character to claim that “es imposible no 
terminar siendo como los otros creen que uno es.” (García Márquez 93)). 
Therefore, this story also serves as an example of how proper names (or 
nicknames) can be used to enable external objectification as they supplement an 
identity. At first glance, however, Memories of My Melancholy Whores does not 
exhibit the same pattern of knowledge/identity assignment depicted by Ferré’s 
story, as its narrator, in describing his life and habits, presents himself as a mere 
“receptacle” of the circumstances that surround him. Yet, a deconstructive 
reading of the story, by engaging with the way in which names and the act of 
naming are used in the narration, reveals that this text is also based on the 
embrace of the same patriarchal understanding of the world that underpins 
“When Women Love Men.” In deconstructing Memories of My Melancholy 
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Whores, we observe that the narrator embraces the “traditional” roles assigned to 
the male-female, and wife-prostitute dichotomies, and takes for granted that 
“female identity” is a form of text (an affixed, recognizable characteristic) to be 
defined by masculine figures.  
The fact that the narrator of Memories of My Melancholy Whores is not yet 
dead establishes some differences between his character and that of Ambrosio 
in “When Women Love Men.” The ninety-year-old, nameless narrator is still 
actively undergoing the life experiences that he is crafting in his memoirs. He, 
therefore, seems to still have a choice about the way in which he relates to 
others. Yet, in reading García Márquez’s novel, we find that the narrator 
systematically attempts to disguise his responsibility in the construction of a type 
of lifestyle that (conveniently) allows him to routinely rent human bodies for his 
own pleasure, while denying these women any further identity but that of “putas” 
(whores). This deferral of responsibility can be detected in the way in which the 
narrator refrains from assuming a fixed identity on his own, and only describes 
himself through the nickname that his community assigned him. In this way, he 
appears to be a receptacle that simply perpetuates an understanding of reality 
handed down to him, either by madams, such as Rosa Cabarcas, or by culture, 
of which his extensive library serves as a sample. 
This apparent lack of agency that characterizes the male character seems 
closely related to his lack of financial success, given that he describes himself as 
a physically and socially ill-favored character, who  has never been married nor 
wealthy. A clear connection seems to exist between economic buying power and 
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respectability, which only reinforces the way in which patriarchal values (namely, 
the idea that men are to support and protect women) play in the story. In this 
way, he lacks the status Ambrosio enjoyed in “When Women Love Men.” As 
head of household and provider, Ambrosio acted as the center par excellence of 
all the women in his life. In contrast, the narrator of Memories of My Melancholy 
Whores sees himself as a trivial man who has no real impact on the life of others.  
Yet, the nickname by which others refer to him, “the scholar,” unveils a 
contradiction between the way in which the narrator conceives himself and the 
way in which the world sees him, between his intellectual insight and his sensory 
experience. In this sense, this alias reveals that while internally the narrator is 
mainly defined in terms of his physical unattractiveness, externally, it is his 
erudition that distinguishes him in the eyes of those who know him. As a result, 
we learn that his community considers him to be a conveyer of culture and 
knowledge, despite the narrator’s effort to present himself as a passive witness 
of a social reality he has not helped to build. 
 
How to do things with names: the making of a “scholar” 
 
In order to understand the kind of knowledge that has formed the identity 
of “the scholar,” it is necessary to learn about those “others” who have 
contributed to his formation. For this enterprise as well, a careful deconstruction 
of the use of proper names throughout the story becomes handy. Everything the 
narrator “knows” was learned through the library he inherited from his snob 
mother, or through the surreptitious life he experienced after his 9-5 job was 
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over. Then, the narrator would spend his time visiting as many brothels as there 
were available in his city. The fruit of such visits was going to be a voluminous 
record that “the scholar” kept in order to track the names, age, and place of the 
different amorous encounters that his money afforded him. 
 This record shows an interesting attempt to affix the memories of the 
women he rented. He collected names as a form of souvenir. At the same time, 
the names recorded by the narrator, by enabling a potential rewriting of his past, 
function as a means of supplementation, as they replace and add to the nature of 
the original experiences. The recording of these names replaces the actual event 
just as any memory, or photograph does: it evokes the experience without being 
the experience in itself. The addition comes in the form of the attribution of a 
false “identity” given that, as the narrator himself recognizes later in the narration 
“whores” have different names for different clients (García Márquez 57). 
Therefore, keeping track of the names of the prostitutes he has “loved” through 
his life has no other value than allowing “the scholar” to assign them an identity 
that it is not theirs. Still, this identification is necessary for the narrator to be able 
to assign these anonymous prostitutes a place in his Memoirs. In this sense, it 
does not matter who these women are, but what matters is whose they are.   
In reading Memories of My Melancholy Whores, it also becomes clear that 
all-powerful characters possess a distinctive name. And the narrator seems 
clearly intimidated by them. Characters such as Rosa Cabarcas, Florina de Dios, 
Damiana, Casilda Armenta, Castorina or Ximena Ortiz have very concrete 
personalities, which are  shown through their interactions with the narrator. All 
S u a r e z  | 28 
 
these women have demands that they expect “the scholar” to fulfill. Rosa 
Cabarcas, for example, is a madam who requires the narrator to pay for the 
services of her workers (García Márquez 22), while Florina de Dios, the 
narrator’s mother is depicted as a figure of authority who had a vast influence on 
his education (García Márquez 37). Likewise, Damiana, as somebody who fell in 
love with the narrator, rejected his money after being raped by him at a very early 
age because she expected a different type of commitment from him (García 
Márquez 42 ), and Ximena Ortiz demanded “the scholar” to marry her before he 
could enjoy her body (García Márquez 38). Even Casilda Arementa, a former 
prostitute the narrator casually meets after many years of not using her services, 
expects the narrator to perform, just as he used to (García Márquez 96).  
Only “Delgadina” is presented as an exception. The virginity of the 
fourteen year old prostitute that Rosa Cabarcas offers to the narrator on his 
ninetieth birthday, opens a universe of possibilities for the man. She serves as a 
tabula rasa insofar as she has no identity (“the scholar” explicitly declines to learn 
her birth name when Rosa attempts to disclosure it), and no expectations for him. 
Her lack of agency is symbolized by her mutism throughout the story, which at 
first is just a consequence of the fact that she is asleep during her first 
encounters with the narrator and eventually becomes a requirement he imposed 
upon her, in order to preserve the “purity” of their idyll. In deconstructing the 
significance of this requirement, we realize that her silence is used as an ultimate 
symbol of her objectification, which imposes a complete invasion of the little girl 
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self that not only allows for her physical penetration but also enables her 
disempowering as an autonomous human being.   
As a result of this “invasion,” the young virgin loses any autonomy over 
her life; she becomes a something that “the scholar” can shape as he pleases. 
This is why, in the old man’s eyes “Delgadina” has no name, no past, and no 
voice. Her entire self is usurped by the fantasies of “the scholar” who, eventually, 
succeeds in presenting himself as the savior of this young soul. Yet, this 
“salvation” only translates in the fact that now the young girl will not longer have 
to rent her body to multiple old-men, it will be enough to reserve herself for “the 
scholar.”  At no point the narrator considers the fact that, perhaps, the so called 
“love” “Delgadina” is claimed to feel for him (love that, pertinently, is not 
enunciated by the young girl as it is Rosa Cabarcas, the madam, who informs 
“the scholar” about the feelings of “Delgadina”) is nothing more than a 
rationalization of the subordination that has been imposed on the fourteen year 
old.  
In this sense, the conclusion of Memories of my Melancholy Whores is 
nothing but a display of différance as understood by Derrida insofar as its 
significance unavoidably depends on the understanding of “love” that the reader 
embraces (García Márquez 109) There is a deferral of meaning that is 
subliminally imposed upon the audience, who is forced to look elsewhere in order 
to “make sense” of a message that is re-written by each reader. To this extent, 
the characters depicted by García Márquez function as empty shells enabling the 
outline of a story that becomes mutable in nature in order to become readable.   
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Part 5 – The Role of Performativity and Context 
Proper Names as Narrative Gaps 
 
 
This comparative analysis is based on the assumption that there are 
common strategies at work in the literary pieces being discussed. These 
strategies, as previously stated, involve “the commodification of identity and the 
interplay of fragmented understanding.” Phrased in this manner, it may be 
tempting to assume that these tactics can be analyzed or understood by 
exploring the motivations that inspired the writers to engage certain assumptions, 
or to build a specific type of story. However, in pursuing such an analysis we 
would be incurring the “intentional fallacy” (which warns critics about focusing on 
the intentions of a writer instead of evaluating her work on the basis of its 
“value”). This fallacy entails the idea that, when it comes to evaluating a literary 
piece, there are questions that cannot simply be answered by means of the 
writer. This paper endorses this understanding of written works, and, in doing so, 
it prioritizes an exploration on the reason why, as readers, we can understand 
the meaning conveyed by a literary work written by others in a different context. 
Hence, the assumption of this analysis is that readers play an active role in the 
commodification of identity that takes place in both texts while also engaging in 
an interplay of fragmented understanding. Consequently, in the last section of 
this work, we will explore the ways in which readers are required to partake in the 
writing of Ferré’s and García Márquez’s texts. 
In deconstructing the way in which names are used by Rosario Ferré and 
García Márquez, we have encountered that they, as conveyors of different 
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identities, systematically enable an exercise of différance:  they distinguish 
subjects while postponing an actual description of their individuality. This 
emptiness of meaning, however, has been disguised through the means of 
further narrative gaps (such as “prostitute,” “wife,” or “scholar”) that transfer the 
responsibility of assigning identity onto the shoulders of the readers. In this way, 
readers learn that Isabel la Negra is a “prostitute,” but they do not learn from 
Ferré’s story what this means. It is the reader’s decision to think of this character 
as a “whore” or as an “entrepreneur.” 
This decision is possible because authors are unable to fully define their 
characters.  Insofar as characters depict living beings, they possess an inherent 
complexity that cannot be fully captured by the (first) person writing the text. Just 
as in “real life” where individuals tend to develop different opinions of the people 
they meet, readers too readily “classify” fictional characters based on their own 
expectations. And it is to enable  this process, this transference of roles, that 
writers need narrative gaps.  A narrative gap is considered to be a device that 
allows readers to fill in (supplement) portions of the story that are not provided by 
the writer. Usually, this term is used to describe contributions the audience 
makes with regard to events (internal or external) that are assumed to have 
taken place in the context of a text. In this analysis, however, I am proposing 
that, language in general, but names in particular, are surreptitious examples of 
narrative gaps. In this way, in the context of literature, the narrative gaps 
enclosed in proper names enable the audience to become an active participant in 
a type of writing that exceeds the limit of the specific literary text at hand. In order 
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to understand the implications of my statement, it is necessary to reflect on the 
nature of writing-reading as well as the differences that apparently keep literature 
and reality apart. By engaging the ideas of John Austin and Jacques Derrida, this 
paper aims to contribute to an understanding of how literary works, such as the 
ones analyzed above, may challenge the notion of authorship altogether by 
forcing the reader to complete a textual reality that does more than map 
preexisting circumstances, it actively writes them. In prompting such a reading, 
all literary texts build their own context as they build themselves. In order to 
clarify how this process works, we are first to draw from John Austin’s work on 
performative language, and Jacques Derrida’s reflections on the meaning of 
context. At the same time, we are going to test our conclusions by using them to 
reflect on the way we read “When Women Love Men,” and Memories of My 
Melancholy Whores. 
 
John Austin and the Literary Work as an Exercise of Performative 
Language 
 
In How To Do Things with Words, the British philosopher John Austin 
introduces a significant distinction between what he describes as "constative" 
statements and "performative" utterances. While the first, according to Austin, 
can be classified as true or false statements that merely describe or report an 
observable situation, the second ones cannot (Austin 5). Performative sentences, 
therefore, present a very special characteristic, says Austin: they do by saying. 
(Austin 6). In his opinion, the uttering of certain words is a "leading incident in the 
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performance of [an] act” (Austin 8). And yet, Austin does not go as far as to claim 
that the act of uttering is in itself enough to make something happen. Instead, he 
goes on to clarify that the action (enabled through the performative locution) may 
require certain conditions to be met in order to be fully realized (8).  Only then, 
claims Austin, is pertinent to classify a performative as a “happy” utterance (14). 
Thus, while a performative locution cannot be classified as “true” or “false,” it may 
be evaluated as  “happy” or “unhappy.”  For example, merely expressing "I name 
this ship the Queen Elizabeth" does not have a real impact if the person making 
such a claim is not the one in charge of naming the boat, or if the boat already 
has a name (9). In such a case, my attempt would be deemed as “unhappy.”  
 Hence, the act of naming (clearly a performative utterance insofar as it 
facilitates an experience that cannot be qualified as “true” or “false”) must be 
evaluated in conjunction with those circumstances that allow those involved in 
the use of the name in question to understand its meaning. There is no point in 
assigning a name if nobody else is going to be able to understand the role that a 
name is to play. In this sense, names have to be negotiated by those who 
choose them and those who agree to use them. And the situation becomes even 
more blurry when the process of naming takes place in the literary realm. 
The intention of this paper is to problematize our understanding of the act 
of writing-reading by proposing that the construction of fictional characters, in the 
context of literary works, entails an exercise of performativity that is executed at 
different levels, and which brings about a transgression of the traditional roles 
assigned to the writer and the reader.  This is possible because, in the context of 
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literary pieces, the first-writer (i.e., Rosario Ferré) is “giving birth” to a character 
that does not exist in the real world (i.e., the world where the work is to be read). 
As a result, “fictional” characters, such as Ambrosio or Isabel la Negra are 
neither inherently “true” nor “false.” Insofar as they exist (just because they have 
been created through the voice of the first-writer), they are the product of a 
performative act. However, the mere will of the speaker (this being the first-
writer), does not in itself guarantee the success of the utterance. In other words, 
even if a writer creates a certain character “on paper,” this character is not “alive” 
until the audience “adopts” such character by admitting that her existence 
“makes sense” to them. In this way, we may say that a “fictional” performative 
utterance is a “happy” act, as defined by Austin, when it gives life to a character 
capable of reaching such a state of independence from her first-writer that it 
becomes an “independent” subject. In other words, it has to be possible for the 
reader (who, in actuality is nothing more than a posterior-writer) to feel that he 
“knows” this character without the mediating presence of the first-writer.  
In this manner, there is a breakdown of reference between the idea the 
writer had in mind while creating a character and the idea the audience 
embraces while reading the text. This is evidence that the enunciation of proper 
names enacts a narrative gap that requires the participation of the reader. To 
such a degree, the act of reading necessarily entails a will to re-write the text, by 
filling the gaps the writer left blank while describing the characters that carry on 
the story. There is so much that readers are not told with regard to the past of the 
individuals they meet throughout the text, and yet, the audience needs to assume 
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they “know” them in order to understand the text. It is in this way that readers 
make a decision every time they encounter a new character, and, in doing so, 
they proceed to “read” the text by rewriting it.  
These decisions, however, do not take place in a vacuum. They are aided, 
and guided, by the will of the first-writer, who sets certain parameters based on 
how the reader is to conceive the fictional character. It is in this way that proper 
names, just as Austin’s performative utterances, do by saying insofar as they 
prompt the reader to conceive a person with certain characteristics (such as a 
ninety-year-old bachelor), that is going to be called in a specific manner (i.e., “the 
scholar”) throughout the narration and which did not exist before the writing took 
place. To such extent, the introduction of a character is “the leading incident in 
the performance of [an] act” (Austin 8).  
 
Tracing performativity in “When Women Love Men” and Memories of My 
Melancholy Whores 
 
Given that the names used by Rosario Ferré and García Márquez do not 
have referential meaning, they enact a negotiation of identity, that is, a certain 
agreement among writers and readers with regard to the finite number of 
interpretations that a certain identity can have. In order to understand the 
assumptions that limit this agreement, we analyzed the ways in which identity is 
assigned in both texts. As a result, we realized that identity is a feature attributed 
from outside (by others), and that it did not need to be a reflection of the 
character's will. In addition, the literary analysis discussed above exposed the 
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fact that only the powerful (such as Ambrosio or “the scholar”) have the privilege 
to define identity, while the non-powerful (namely, women) are condemned to 
embrace the role attributed to them in order to succeed in their given 
environments.  
Within the texts, therefore, there is a commodification of identity insofar as 
interpersonal relations are consistently described in terms of an economic 
exchange that assigns each part specific roles: that of the assignor and the 
receptacle. If the latter wants to have any kind of agency, she is to please the 
former by fulfilling her role properly.  At the same time, the authority and power of 
the assignor depends on the willingness of the non-powerful to accept his will. In 
reading “When Women Love Men” and Memories of My Melancholy Whores, we 
experience identity as the byproduct of this dynamic of power relations:  men 
define women, and women define men by letting them define what femininity is. 
Performative acts, therefore, take place at several levels during the writing 
process of these pieces given that not only the first- writers, namely Rosario 
Ferré and García Márquez do (create) by saying (while introducing new 
characters into the narration), but also the characters themselves give the illusion 
of engaging in performative acts, when they assign identity in the context of the 
narration. In the examples used above, these “fictional” performative acts occur 
not only when men name women, but also when women adopt the names (and 
the roles) that Ambrosio and “the scholar” have assigned them. To test the 
significance of this assertion, it is enough to imagine what would have happened 
(or what our reading would be) had the two Isabels rebelled against the authority 
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of Ambrosio, or had “Delgadina” told “the scholar” her real name. If such would 
have been the case, the audience (posterior-writers) would encounter a situation 
where the performative act of naming (and its subliminal assignation of identity) 
as practiced by the main male characters in both stories would have resulted in 
an “infelicity” (Austin 14). That is, if the circumstances were not appropriate, 
these performative locutions would have been “unhappy” (Austin 14). This does 
not mean that we would be in a position to deem the attempt to assign names 
(and identity) as “false,” given that Ambrosio would still be calling his two women 
“Isabel” and the scholar would probably insist on thinking of his virgin bride as 
“Delgadina.” However, these acts would have been interpreted as a failed 
attempt to possess the subjects being defined by such names.  
This distinction we just discussed, namely, the distinction that is to be 
established between the performative utterances performed by the first-writer of 
a literary piece and the “fictional” performative locutions executed by the 
characters of a story, refers us, once again to the exercise of différance that 
underpins the act of writing-reading. Différance is present every time readers 
embrace the illusion that the identity of the characters they encounter through the 
text is established within the literary text. In this way, there is a deferral of 
responsibility that allows “readers” to avoid their final responsibility as posterior-
writers of the literary pieces they read. This is why readers do not normally 
believe they function as writers of the texts they encounter.    
Yet, this is a misguided understanding of “reading.” Precisely because of 
the written nature of literary works, they are expected to survive their writers. 
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Consequently, it is not possible to claim that the reason why a character such as 
Isabel Luberza “makes sense” is because we know what Rosario Ferré meant 
when she created her. The reason why these characters “exist” is because 
readers accept the challenge to fulfill the narrative gap such a name represents, 
and have decided who Isabel Luberza really is.  
 
Jacques Derrida on the Meaning of Context  
 
Yet, it is a legitimate question to ask: why is it that readers do not consider 
themselves to be posterior-writers of pieces they consume? Why is it that they 
tend to assume that the characters they meet within a literary text are already 
finished products created by the first-writer? In order to elaborate a response for 
these questions, we will engage the ideas that the French philosopher Jacques 
Derrida proposed with regard to the nature of context, and how it affects the 
dynamics of reading and writing.  
According to Derrida, writing entails that the person who writes releases a 
message that is “cut off from him and continues to produce effects beyond his 
presence and beyond the present actuality of his meaning” (Derrida 87). Yet,  
this “meaning” only makes sense when its “sense” is, at least potentially, 
intelligible to an external other: "A writing that was not structurally legible –
iterable- beyond the death of the addressee would not be writing” (90). In saying 
this, Derrida is ratifying the former negotiation of meaning we discussed above, 
namely, that readers and writers have to be able to understand each other on a 
certain level. In addition, Derrida makes specific claims to establish language, 
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and, in particular morphologic symbols, as the main conveyors of negotiable 
meaning. In this regard, the “laws of writing” as described by Derrida mandate 
that the signs that make writing possible, and communication attainable, have to 
be repeatable and citable.  
Derrida’s take on the importance of the iterability of the sign provides an 
interesting framework for the analysis of the dynamics that misguide readers into 
believing that “meaning” is a finite message handed down from (first) writers to 
readers.  In exposing our expectations with regards to the “repeatability” of 
linguistic signs, Derrida is providing an interesting starting point to use when 
analyzing the concept of “identity.” According to him, “a written sign [...] is 
therefore a mark which remains, which is not exhausted in the present of its 
inscription” (Derrida 92). In the context of literature, proper names become such 
marks and therefore are subjected to the same incompleteness any other sign is. 
As a consequence, they are also susceptible to what Derrida calls “the 
phenomenon of the crisis of meaning,” insofar as they are cut off from any 
referent. It is precisely because of this lack of referent that proper names, as 
conveyors of a certain identity, are to be understood as instances of performative 
language.  
In this regard, it is interesting to think of the ways in which proper names, 
(just as signs, according to Derrida) can “engender infinitely new contexts” (97). 
An example of this is illustrated by the way in which, independently of whether 
our reading of Isabel Luberza or “the scholar” matched with the ideas of Ferré or 
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García Márquez, those characters are to stay with us. Regardless of what the 
first-writers do, they cannot “kill” the characters they have conceived.  
They have created something through language and undoubtedly acted 
upon the world in a manner that is not merely descriptive.  In that way, the 
utterance of performatives in the context of literature represents a very particular 
type of occurrence, given that, as long as there is some potential reader for the 
work of the first-writer, this one can rest assured that the act that inspired his 
locution will be a “happy” one. His characters will survive him, not because they 
are his, but because through narrative gaps they can live without him. In this 
way, fictional characters, conceived through a performative utterance of a first-
writer come to exist in the blurry free zone we call “context.” 
In this way, while Derrida tells us that context is “the set of presences 
which organize the moment of its inscription” (Derrida 92), I would like to argue 
that “context” is nothing more than a potential infinite interplay of fragmented 
understandings that come together to facilitate a communally constructed 
“meaning.” Context, therefore, becomes a free-zone where the literary and the 
material world store their common references. This is the realm where readers 
learn to establish differences between what it “means” to be a prostitute and what 
it “means” to be a wife, even though, in reading “When Women Love Men” such 
a distinction becomes blurry. This is also the universe that establishes the 
difference between a “scholar” and  a “pervert,” between a man who learns from 
others and a man who actively sets negative examples for others to follow. In 
adopting one definition over the other, readers reshape what Derrida calls “the 
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moment of [the sign’s] inscription.” This choice implies that every reader travels 
back and forth between text and context, between the fictional and the material 
world, between the roles of reader and writer. In other words, when a reader 
decides that the narrator of Memories of My Melancholy Whores is indeed “a 
man in love,” this reader is validating patriarchal values by avoiding to engage 
with the multiple ways in which “the scholar” objectifies “Delgadina.” It is 
important to notice that this interpretation is not imposed by García Márquez. 
There is the possibility of writing a different story by deconstructing the way in 
which, while reading, we prioritize certain expectations over others (namely, the 
idea that all women want to have somebody to care for them, despite the 
motivations that inspire such interest). 
In the case of “When Women Love Men”, we observe how this 
communication between first-writer and posterior ones (namely, the readers) is 
facilitated through the deferral of meaning that takes place when Ferré describes 
Isabel la Negra as a “prostitute.” It is precisely this iterability of the sign, to use 
Derrida’s terminology, that (mistakenly) allows her readers to think of Ferré’s 
locution as constantive instead of performative. Because she is not inventing the 
term “prostitute,” readers gain a sense of familiarity that misleads them into 
believing that in thinking of Isabel la Negra as a “whore,” they are not saying 
anything the first-writer (namely, Ferré) did not say already. In this way, readers 
conceal the fact that they have no way to know what referents Rosario Ferré had 
in mind when she created the characters of “When Women Love Men.” By 
assuming that there is only a writer but many readers, the audience declines to 
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acknowledge that the act of reading involves the necessity to make choices in 
order to find meaning. Instead, it is claimed that meaning is established between 
the first-writer and the context in which the writing-reading takes place. 
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Conclusion: 
Austin’s performative utterances refer to those situations where speaking 
does much more than describing a situation that can be evaluated as true or 
false. The performatives, as Austin calls these locutions, refer to those 
opportunities where by saying or in saying something we are doing something. 
Based on this interpretation of the term, we can see that the characters 
described in the fiction pieces here analyzed in themselves represent examples 
of performative occurrences: they have been created by a locution, they exist 
because Rosario Ferré and García Márquez pronounce them alive. However, 
given that, according to Austin, the mere utterance of the performatives is not 
enough to guarantee the fulfillment of the acts that these forms of speech attempt 
to enable, there are other requirements that need to be met for the performatives 
to have effect. If these conditions are not satisfied, we may say instead that the 
utterances are “unhappy,” as Austin claims that performatives are never to be 
evaluated in terms of whether they are true or false, but in terms of whether they 
encounter some “infelicities” or not. In this manner, the “success” or effectiveness 
of the original writing performed by Rosario Ferré and García Márquez 
intrinsically depends on whether the circumstances surrounding their occurrence 
(namely, the context in which they are to be read) validate them. This validation, 
this paper argues, is a re-writing of the original text, disguised under the label of 
“reading.” Readers, therefore, necessarily complete a text by assigning ultimate 
meaning to the characters that first-writers can never fully describe. Many other 
elements present in literary creations, such as places and events, are 
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“experienceable” occurrences for readers, insofar as these are signifiers with 
concrete signifieds. Characters, however, are not. Therefore, characters are not 
“true” or “false” predicaments. They are the product of a performative venture 
carried on by what we had come to call the “first writer” of a text, namely, the 
person who took the initiative to bring “Ambrosio” or “Delgadina” to life. Yet, 
these characters would not be said to “exist” if readers were not able to 
appropriate them, in order to decide how to interpret the significance of their 
actions. In this way, readers fill a narrative gap every time they meet a character 
and manage to make sense of her without the support of the first-writer. Such a 
leap entails an almost unconscious act of rewriting, which makes readers 
posterior-writers by default. And it is through this transgression of roles that 
readers and writers become the makers of a context that makes the frontiers that 
keep literature and the everyday world apart obsolete. Insofar as first-writers 
create their characters while trying to anticipate a kind of reader that will be able 
to understand them, they engage in a “reading” of their audience. At the same 
time, readers (posterior writers) assume the task of deciding what a text is 
saying, and in doing so write their own versions of the text. And they both have to 
deal with the limitations imposed by their contexts. 
 In this thesis, I have, to a certain extent, followed the ideas of Jacques 
Derrida in order to define “context,” and have concluded that a “context” is 
defined by the potential infinite interplay of fragmented understandings that, for 
the sake of “communication” (that is, in order to preserve the iterability of the 
sign), have to come together in order to negotiate a certain “meaning.”  To a 
S u a r e z  | 45 
 
certain extent, contexts do succeed in establishing a certain horizon of 
intelligibility to be shared between first and posterior writers. However, when it 
comes to “understanding” characters, context cannot attribute nor define what is 
to be considered as “proper” meaning. Only readers do, and, in order to do that, 
they inevitably become posterior-writers. This is how performativity finds its place 
in literature.  
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